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‘THIS HAPPY NONENTITY’ 
HAZLITT, HUME, AND THE ESSAY 
 
Tim Milnes 
 
Recent studies of the philosophical character of the Romantic familiar essay have 
situated the genre within the conventions of Romantic aesthetic theory. Uttara Natarajan, for 
instance, depicts the development of the familiar essay as part of the Romantic project to 
unify poetry and philosophy, arguing that ‘[t]he romantic essay shares with romantic poetry, 
an aesthetic founded upon the attempt, or […] the failure, to represent the infinite through 
finite means.’1 In a similar vein, David Duff has drawn attention to the way in which the 
digressive, paratactic, and impressionistic epistemology of the familiar essay models itself 
upon Romantic poetics. The essay’s performance of its ‘half-knowledge,’ its reflexive self-
theorisation through practice, he finds, ‘only comes to full power, and full understanding of 
itself, through the stimulus of Romantic lyric.’2 Viewed from perspectives such as these, the 
Romantic familiar essay appears as the product of a merging of British empiricism with a 
new, nascent idealism, what Natarajan calls a ‘symbiosis of the experiential and the ideal,’ 
itself a ‘hallmark of British as distinct from German idealism.’3 Thus, the prosateur Romantic 
essayist, like his poetic counterpart, subordinates the senses to the mind as a means of 
exploring the ‘experiential’ through an aesthetics of sublimity. 
Running parallel to these approaches is a tendency to represent the Romantic essay’s 
unification of the poetic and the philosophical as the fulfilment of an eighteenth-century quest 
for a form of cultural communication that bridged the worlds of the quotidian and the 
intellectual. This aspiration is encapsulated by David Hume in his unpublished essay, ‘Of 
Essay-Writing’, in which the essayist assumes the role of a cultural diplomat between the 
worlds of learning and polite conversation:  
 
Learning has been as great a Loser by being shut up in Colleges and Cells, and 
secluded from the World and good Company. By that Means, every Thing of what we 
call Belles Lettres became totally barbarous, being cultivated by Men without any 
Taste of Life or Manners, and without that Liberty and Facility of Thought and 
                                                          
1 Uttara Natarajan, ‘The Veil of Familiarity: Romantic Philosophy and the Familiar Essay,’ Studies in 
Romanticism 42.1 (spring 2003), 27-44: 31.   
2 David Duff, ‘Charles Lamb’s Art of Intimation,’ Wordsworth Circle 43.3 (summer 2012), 127-34:133. 
3 Natarajan, ‘The Veil of Familiarity’, 31.  
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Expression, which can only be acquir’d by Conversation. Even Philosophy went to 
Wrack by this moaping recluse Method of Study, and became as chimerical in her 
Conclusions as she was unintelligible in her Stile and Manner of Delivery. And 
indeed, what cou’d be expected from Men who never consulted Experience in any of 
their Reasonings, or who never search’d for that Experience, where alone it is to be 
found, in common Life and Conversation? 
[...] In this View, I cannot but consider myself as a Kind of Resident or 
Ambassador from the Dominions of Learning to those of Conversation [...]4 
 
With its amenability to tentative, unmethodical improvisation and friendly 
conversation, the familiar essay seemed to fit an image of thought based on the same custom, 
habit and sentiment embodied by Hume’s picture of a decentred, trusting intersubjectivity. 
For Hume, essaying as an activity eschews the quest for certainty and instead fosters an idea 
of ‘experience’ as an experimental activity in which the mind comes to reshape itself through 
its engagement with human life in ‘the common course of the world.’ Here, Hume is treading 
on what would have been familiar ground for most of his readers. Since the days of The 
Spectator and The Tatler, the periodical essay had functioned as both medium and metaphor 
for the open, egalitarian and polite discursiveness of the public sphere. Indeed, Addison and 
Steele actively exploited the essay’s potential to move amphibiously across boundaries, 
between philosophical and literary modes of expression, as well as between academic and 
informal writing. Thus, in The Spectator no. 10, Addison declares his intention to emulate 
Socrates, who ‘brought Philosophy down from Heaven, to inhabit among Men,’ by bringing 
‘Philosophy out of Closets and Libraries, Schools and Colleges, to dwell in Clubs and 
Assemblies, at Tea-tables, and in Coffee-houses.’5  
It is, then, tempting to see the Romantic aestheticisation of the familiar essay as an 
extension of the practices of the periodical essayists of an earlier era. Thus, while Addison 
and Hume endeavoured to broaden intellectual culture by essayistically mediating between 
‘study’ and ‘conversation,’ the Romantic essay’s attempt to synthesise poetry and philosophy 
promises to achieve on a formal level the performance of familiarity and communicability 
that its eighteenth-century precursors could only describe. Consequently (according to 
Natarajan), Hume’s model of the essayist as ambassador between the realms of learning and 
                                                          
4 David Hume, ‘Of Essay-Writing,’ Essays Moral, Political, and Literary 1741-77, ed. Eugene F. Miller, rev. 
ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985), 534-5. 
5 Joseph Addison, The Spectator, ed. Donald F. Bond, 5 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), I, 44. 
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conversation is fully realised only by Hazlitt’s essayistic practice, by his Romantic 
incorporation of the conversability hypothesised in Hume’s essays into the very voice of the 
essayist. Hazlitt certainly appears to have something like this in mind in his 1825 
Advertisement to the Paris edition of Table Talk. Here, he claims that one of the aims of the 
volume was to embody at a stylistic level the conversational ideals of the eighteenth-century 
essay: 
 
I had remarked that when I had written or thought upon a particular topic, and 
afterwards had occasion to speak of it with a friend, the conversation generally took a 
much wider range, and branched off into a number of indirect and collateral 
questions, which were not strictly connected with the original view of the subject, but 
which often threw a curious and striking light upon it, or upon human life in general. 
It therefore occurred to me as possible to combine the advantages of these two styles, 
the literary and conversational; or after stating and enforcing some leading idea, to 
follow it up by such observations and reflections as would probably suggest 
themselves in discussing the same questions in company with others. This seemed to 
me to promise a greater variety and richness, and perhaps a greater sincerity, than 
could be attained by a more precise and scholastic method. The same consideration 
had an influence on the familiarity and conversational idiom of the style which I have 
used.6 
 
And yet, reading Hazlitt’s essays in this way runs the risk of overlooking one important 
respect in which Hazlitt’s essayistic theory and practice ran counter to that of Addison and 
Hume. Indeed, the intellectual bridge between Hume and Hazlitt is dwarfed by the gulf that 
separates them.  
To appreciate this, we need to distinguish between two contemporary aesthetic 
models: the aesthetics of the sublime and the aesthetics of the liminal. Like its eighteenth-
century predecessor, the Romantic essay is generically ambiguous, inhabiting a marginal 
cultural territory between the disciplinary categories of science and philosophy and the 
imaginative pleasures afforded by literary arts such as poetry and fiction. Unlike its 
Enlightenment precursor, however, the Romantic essay is presented with two different ways 
of exploiting this marginality. On one hand, in a Humean spirit of consensualism, it can 
                                                          
6 William Hazlitt, The Complete Works of William Hazlitt, ed. by P.P. Howe, 21 vols (London and Toronto: 
J.M. Dent and Sons, 1930-34), VIII, 333. 
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attempt to negotiate cultural differences; on the other, by invoking a reinvigorated faculty of 
imagination, it can seek to transcend them. This dilemma manifests itself in the Romantic 
essay as a tension between quotidian liminality and sublime transcendence: between, on one 
hand, the engagement in the pragmatic diplomacy of communication, and, on the other, the 
exertion of power manifested as an incommensurable ‘aesthetic’ experience. 
The distinction I allude to here is further illuminated by Ian Duncan’s account of the 
two fundamental ways in which literary works of this period endeavour to negotiate the 
blurred boundary between fiction and reality. The first mode, which Duncan describes as 
Kantian-transcendental or lyrical, is familiar to students of Romanticism. On this model, 
aesthetic experience acquires a recuperative function, compensating for the loss of epistemic 
foundations and their replacement with merely transcendental conditions. Accordingly, 
representations of the fragmented self offer a fleeting and indirect glimpse of an impossible 
unity. In transcendental aesthetics, ‘Literature’ becomes (potentially, at least) sublime, which 
is another way of saying that literature assumes a unique, asymptotic relation to the Absolute. 
Thus, as Friedrich Schlegel writes of ‘transcendental poetry’ in Fragment 238 of the 
Athenäum Fragments, Literature ‘emerges as satire in the absolute difference of ideal and 
real, hovers in between as elegy, and ends as idyll with the absolute identity of the two.’7 
Transcendental lyricism remains serious (albeit nostalgically so) about truth—offering the 
prospect of an aesthetic resolution of human division in the dark foundations of Schelling’s 
intellectual intuition, or in the form of an ineffable ‘Literary Absolute.’ 8 
Duncan, however, also identifies a second major aesthetic paradigm: a Humean-
empirical or novelistic aesthetic, which remains poised between truth and fiction with no 
projected foundation beyond that of the goal of cultivating consensus though conversation.9 
On this model, the representational power of literature is deflated. Thus, for a rhetorically-
minded ironist such as Hume, literature simply helps to promote and regulate communication 
in the public sphere by mediating between different forms of life (primarily, the reflective 
and the quotidian). Such diplomacy was exemplified by the essay, which, as cultural mediator 
                                                          
7 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘From Athenäum Fragments,’ The Origins of Modern Critical Thought: German Aesthetic 
and Literary Criticism from Lessing to Hegel, ed. by David Simpson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), 195. 
8 See F.W.J. Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, trans. by Peter Heath (Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 1978). Answering the question of how the subjective is to become objective, i.e. how intuition 
can intuit itself, Schelling claims that ‘[t]his universally acknowledged and altogether incontestable objectivity 
of intellectual intuition is art itself. For the aesthetic intuition simply is the intellectual intuition become 
objective.’ (228) 
9 See Ian Duncan, Scott’s Shadow: The Novel in Romantic Edinburgh (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2007), 124. 
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par excellence, moved harmoniously between the worlds of earnest philosophising and polite 
conversation. For Hume, the essayistic imagination involved a performative doubling of 
personae and perspectives, a form of open-ended mediating between the systematic 
understanding of the philosopher and the pragmatic diplomacy of the conversationalist in the 
lifeworld. The goal of this activity was the consolidation of social, and, ultimately, 
epistemological norms. My suggestion here then, is that Duncan’s distinction between 
transcendental and empirical aesthetics (what I refer to, respectively, as the sublime and the 
liminal) in the Romantic novel is also is helpful for reflecting upon what is at stake, 
epistemologically and rhetorically, in the Romantic familiar essay.  
The shift from a liminal aesthetics of mediation and consolidation to a sublime 
aesthetics of transcendence is, in part, a consequence of the decline of the public sphere upon 
which the former depended. The epistemology of the Romantic familiar essay, no less than 
other, more celebrated literary forms of the Romantic period, is moulded by circumstances 
associated with industrial and political revolution. Jon Klancher has demonstrated the ways in 
which the periodical played a vital role in cultivating the idea of a public sphere by 
organising audiences and evoking ‘a textual society unifying readers otherwise divided into 
hierarchic social ranks.’10 As this ‘textual society’ segmented into political factions whose 
interests and world-views appeared unbridgeable, however, the figure of the sympathetic, 
neutral spectator prized by Addison and Smith suffered a similar fate to that of the generalist 
man of letters. For instance, reviewing the reviews in 1824, James Mill identified the very 
communicability of the modern periodicals as the source of modern partisanship. For Mill, 
the responsiveness of the periodical press to public debate drove its craven adherence to 
political ‘interests’ at the cost of objectivity. ‘Periodical literature depends upon immediate 
success,’ Mill complains: ‘It must, therefore, patronise the opinions which are now in vogue, 
the opinions of those who are now in power.’11 Similarly, for Hazlitt, the public sphere, 
which had already fragmented through the expansion of print media and a rapid increase in 
the dissemination of knowledge, could no longer function as a foundation for epistemic 
solidarity. 
And yet, the ground Hazlitt shares with Mill—and with the Scottish Enlightenment 
more generally—ends here. Hazlitt rejects utilitarian rationalism, associating the latter with a 
Scottish philosophy of self-interest and with the commercialisation of letters that he holds 
                                                          
10 Jon P. Klancher, The Making of English Reading Audiences, 1790-1832 (Madison, WI: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1987), p. 15. 
11 [James Mill], ‘Periodical Literature:Edinburgh Review,’ Westminster Review, 1.1 (January 1824), 206-49: 
209. 
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responsible for glutting the public appetite with cheap printed material. In ‘The Main 
Chance,’ he depicts rational egoism as a form of mental commodification that fetishized a 
‘certain form or outside appearance of utility’ in objects, while neglecting ‘the natural, pulpy, 
wholesome, nutritious substance, the principle of vitality.’ Utilitarianism—itself, for Hazlitt, 
the philosophy of an aggregative, purely mechanical intellect—produces a ‘frigid habit of 
mind [in which] the real uses of things harden and crystallise; the pith and marrow are 
extracted out of them, leaving nothing but the husk or shell […].’ Moreover, since it 
promoted a view of well-being in which ‘the idea of property is gradually abstracted from the 
advantage it may be of even to ourselves,’ it was ultimately self-defeating.12 Against this 
perspective, Hazlitt pits his moral idealism, his belief that the mind forms experience, and 
hence its own moral objectives (self-interested and disinterested alike). This in turn is rooted 
in his conviction that the diversity and complexity of our experience always outstrips our 
conceptions, and that, as he declares in Characteristics: In the Manner of Rochefoucault’s 
Maxims (1823), ‘[t]ruth is not one, but many.’13 The error of ‘people of sense’, such as 
Bentham and Shelley, is that by mistaking the abstract, rational forms that quantify 
experience for the ‘pith and marrow’ of the thing itself, they come to know only ‘the form, 
not the power of truth.’14  
This reaction against the Scottish Enlightenment ideal of a sociable ‘progress of 
sentiments’ stems, in large part, from Hazlitt’s ambivalent relationship with the print culture 
upon which his journalistic career depended. The material conditions of the periodical and the 
cultural location of the essayist had shifted in fundamental ways since the age of Hume and 
Johnson. Crucial to these changes was a dramatic increase in readily available information 
through the explosion of print media in the early nineteenth century. This, together with 
increasing scientific, technical and professional specialisation, led to the demise of the 
Enlightenment ideal of the ‘Universal Intellect’: the man of letters who was accomplished in 
all fields of learning. As Nathan Drake observed in 1814, knowledge had proliferated and 
diversified to such an extent that ‘[t]o comprehend the intricacies of speculative science, or to 
relish the elaborate productions of genius, requires not only the education of many years, but 
                                                          
12 Hazlitt, Works, XVII, 277. See also: ‘On the Scotch Character,’ [The Liberal, January 1823]: ‘a Scotchman is 
a machine, and should be constructed on sound moral, and philosophical principles, or should be put a stop to 
altogether’ (ibid, 106).  
13 Hazlitt, Works, IX,. 228. 
14 ‘On People of Sense,’ Hazlitt, Works, XII, 248. 
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much subsequent leisure through life […].’15 Indeed, the demands of trade and business 
meant that even the leisured classes struggled to keep up:  
 
In a country just rising into consequence by commercial efforts, where, with the 
exception of a few individuals devoted to an academical or professional life, the 
higher and middle classes are but little acquainted with the pleasures and advantages 
of literature […]; it will be in vain that attention is called to philological enquiry or 
studied exhortation.16 
 
Drake suggests that these cultural developments present an opportunity for the essayist. 
Amidst the bewildering complexities of speculative science and the productions of genius, 
the ideal role for the essay genre is that of a cultural aggregator. The essay, he notes, is the 
perfect medium for an age of commercial and communicative surplus, providing the ‘higher 
and middle classes’ with a digest of information in a world in which it is no longer possible to 
maintain a familiarity with every branch of knowledge.  
In retrospect, Drake’s vision underestimated the extent to which the rapidly changing 
economy of the early nineteenth century would fundamentally reshape the inner structure of 
the essay itself. Hazlitt, by contrast, was more alert to the need for a new paradigm for 
essaying. In his 1823 essay ‘The Periodical Press,’ he argues that modernity’s surplus of 
knowledge called for a reconsideration of the very function of the periodical writer: 
 
To dig to the bottom of a subject through so many generations of authors, is now 
impossible: the concrete mass is too voluminous and vast to be contained in any 
single head; and therefore we must have essences and samples as substitutes for it. 
We have collected a superabundance of raw materials: the grand desideratum now is, 
to fashion and render them portable.17 
 
The key word here is ‘essences.’ In an era that was witnessing a superabundance of 
information, the essay no longer contributed to the progress of knowledge. Instead of 
aggregating information, Hazlitt argues, the periodical essay achieves its distinctive form of 
cultural autonomy by distilling the spirit of the age.  
                                                          
15 Nathan Drake, Essays, Biographical, Critical and Historical, Illustrative of the Tatler, Spectator and 
Guardian, 2nd edn, 3 vols (London: Suttaby, Evance, and Fox, 1814), I, 15. 
16 Drake, Essays, I, 16. 
17 Hazlitt, Works, XVI, 219-20. 
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This reconfiguration the essayist was a characteristically Romantic response to the 
intellectual fragmentation of contemporary culture. As the figure of the man of letters 
diversified into the expert (the ‘natural philosopher’, for example, into the ‘scientist’ and the 
‘philosopher’), the essay as literary or scientific tool increasingly seemed fit for no purpose in 
particular, an amphibious genre whose ability to move between environments seemed 
maladapted to a milieu in which only the specialist thrived. Writing in 1923, George Marr 
traced the beginning of the periodical essay’s demise at the end of the eighteenth century to a 
decline in the culture of consensus and to rapidly changing reading practices: 
 
It was not till the last decade or so of the eighteenth century, when new forces were 
being brought to bear on society and stirring it to its depths, that men were no longer 
satisfied with the little moral essay, the little didactic tale, the evergreen Eastern 
allegory, and the imaginary “characters” drawn for their improvement, but called for a 
stronger and more varied literary diet. And then that particular form of the essay 
became extinct.18 
 
Marr depicts the passing of the genre as a kind of cultural enclosure, with the essay’s 
common ground being broken up and repurposed by more dedicated literary forms that 
borrowed elements and developed them in ways that the original format could not. The first 
and most obvious of these genres was the novel, which, by expanding the little didactic tale’ 
and ‘evergreen Eastern allegory’ into richer, longer and more sophisticated narratives, 
‘sucked the essay dry […].’19 Secondly, the rise of criticism and heavyweight reviews such as 
the Edinburgh, the Quarterly and Blackwood’s in the early nineteenth century dwarfed the 
relatively modest critical efforts of the eighteenth-century periodical essay. The third and 
most significant cause in the eclipse of the essay, however, was the rise of the magazine, 
which, with its greater size and wider range of interests, offered an ‘infinitely varied dietary 
of story and article […].’20  
One significant consequence of the essay’s perceived failure to be either sufficiently 
focused and serious (like the critical review) or satisfyingly varied and entertaining (like the 
magazine), was an increasing tendency for the genre to turn in on itself, evacuating ‘content’ 
in favour of self-conscious reflection. In this way, by restyling itself as a form of meta-media, 
                                                          
18 George S. Marr, The Periodical Essayists of the Eighteenth Century (London: James Clark & Co.,, 1923), 11. 
19 Marr, Periodical Essayists,  249. 
20 Ibid, 253. 
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the essay acquired surplus value as a cultural commodity. As pure commentary, it was free to 
cover any subject with no unity of method other than an ever-present awareness of its own 
status as cultural mediator: ‘“We are nothing, if not critical,”’ Hazlitt writes in ‘The 
Periodical Press’: ‘Be it so: but then let us be critical, or we shall be nothing.’21 
Consequently, as Leigh Hunt notes in the Indicator, the essayist becomes a doubled figure, a 
purveyor of everything and ‘nothing’. The aim of the essay, he claims, 
 
[…] is to be modest: it is to be expressive: it is to be new: it is to be striking: it is to 
have something in it equally intelligible to the man of plain understanding, and 
surprising for the man of imagination:—in a word, it is to be impossible. 
 How far we have succeeded in the attainment of this happy nonentity, we 
leave others to judge.’22 
 
Both Hazlitt’s depiction of periodical writing as ‘nothing’ but criticism and Hunt’s 
image of a ‘happy nonentity’ invert Drake’s idea of the essay as cultural digest in response to 
what they perceive to be its ‘impossible’ task: to be all things to all people and still be 
distinctive. They also reflect what Duncan has identified as the abstracted nothingness at the 
heart of the contemporary notion of ‘common life,’ which in turn becomes ‘a medium at once 
transparent and opaque,’ an abstraction, a ‘“nothing”’.23 This conception of common life as a 
kind of nothingness ultimately stems from Hume’s sceptical withdrawal of a reality principle 
from the quotidian. Hume’s argument that everyday belief had no metaphysical foundation 
moved him to situate thought at the unstable boundary of fiction and belief, where, as Duncan 
puts it, ‘[o]ur sentimental investment in common life’ and customs is ‘framed by the fitful, 
uneven knowledge of their fictiveness.’ 24 While Duncan focuses his attention upon the ways 
in which Romantic fiction comes to embody and represent this ‘nothing’ at the heart of 
empirical reality, Hunt’s and Hazlitt’s ruminations suggest that the essay in this period was 
no less involved in exploring the doublings of consciousness required to maintain the 
reflective and the quotidian in productive dialogue, in an epistemological form of suspended 
animation. For Hume, such doubling was largely a pragmatic matter, in that it made 
communication and getting on with everyday life possible. Hazlitt, however, saw in it a 
                                                          
21 Hazlitt, Works, XVI, 213. 
22 Leigh Hunt, The Indicator and the Companion; A Miscellany for the Fields and the Fire-Side, 2 vols 
(London: Henry Colburn, 1834), I, 1-2. 
23 Duncan, Scott’s Shadow, 117. 
24 Ibid, 123. 
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potential source of re-enchantment, a basis for transcending the conditions of a mechanised, 
alienated consciousness – in other words, as a source of possible sublimity. 
At the heart of the idea of the essay as a ‘happy nonentity,’ then, is a paradox. 
Struggling against the professionalization of the relationship between writer and reader and 
the commodification of the work of literature, Hazlitt nonetheless relied upon that economy 
for his literary livelihood. The product of this contradiction, as has been widely noted since 
Raymond Williams, is a ‘super-reality’ theory of art based upon imaginative truth and 
projected towards an ‘Ideal Reader’ who was capable of approaching literary works non-
instrumentally.25 By idealising the sympathetic function of the work of art and the audience 
that engaged with it, the Romantic essayist engages in what Klancher describes as a kind of 
‘audience-making,’ itself a form of ‘cultural capitalism’, producing a value-added commodity 
in which aesthetic experience was configured not as an ideological position but ‘a mode of 
reception and comprehension,’ a ‘reading habit.’26 As literary quantity is refined into quality, 
intersubjective consensus and epistemic solidarity is replaced by aesthetic activity as the 
ultimate foundation of cultural and epistemological norms. 
In this respect, at least, Hazlitt’s aesthetic model for the essay parallels that of 
publications such as Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine and the London Magazine, both of 
which respond to anxieties surrounding literary commodification by producing surplus 
epistemic value in the form of self-conscious intellectualism.27 As Klancher argues, by doing 
so these publications sought to redeem ‘social and psychological fragmentation by 
recollectively bouncing back toward a fusion with the self’s own ultimate ground’—a ground 
that was itself transcendental and putatively apolitical.28 Similarly, by sophisticating the 
literary product with an ineffable aesthetics of ‘power’ and ‘common sense’, Hazlitt 
endeavours to transcend its material conditions. Like Hume and Johnson before him, he 
presents the essay and essaying as a prototype for human experience as a whole. While Hume 
and Johnson had attempted to consolidate the normative order that underpinned such 
experience, however, Hazlitt seeks to transcend that order through an aestheticized form of 
social empiricism. The aura of ‘nothingness’ that surrounded the essay was no longer the 
transparent medium of common life, but instead the privileged sphere of aesthetic 
contemplation that he outlines in ‘On the Pleasure of Painting’: 
                                                          
25 Raymond Williams, Culture and Society 1780-1950 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1967), 35. 
26 Klancher, The Making of English Reading Audiences, 33. 
27 Duncan notes that John Gibson Lockhart’s interest in Friedrich Schlegel led him to the ‘figure of a 
transcendental subject—a “national mind”’, displacing political intent into purely aesthetic purposiveness’ 
(Scott’s Shadow, 56). 
28 Klancher, The Making of English Reading Audiences, 58. 
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I have more satisfaction in my own thoughts than in dictating them to others: words 
are necessary to explain the impression of certain things upon me to the reader, but 
they rather weaken and draw a veil over than strengthen it to myself. […] The ideas 
we cherish most exist best in a kind of shadowy abstraction, 
“Pure in the last recesses of the mind;” 
and derive neither force nor interest from being exposed to public view. They 
are old familiar acquaintance, and any change in them, arising from the adventitious 
ornaments of style or dress, is little to their advantage.29 
 
Romanticising the form and content of the familiar essay involved moving the social 
intuition theorised by the Scottish Enlightenment indoors, into the private domain of 
consciousness and individual imagination, of inexpressible impressions and shadowy 
abstractions. In Hazlitt’s work the essayist mediates less between social formations and more 
between idealised phenomenological realms of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ experience. Consequently, 
the ludic indeterminacy of Hazlitt’s imagination is typically oriented by an aesthetic, not a 
social purposiveness: its playfulness signifies not the pragmatic presuppositions of 
communication (as it had in Hume), but the dark foundations of consciousness and identity. 
Thus, although Hazlitt’s professed attempt to incorporate familiar conversation into the style 
of the essay superficially echoes the socialising objectives of Addison and Hume, his 
aesthetics takes the familiar essay in an entirely new direction. While the operations of the 
eighteenth-century essay sought to underpin sociability by buttressing the conventions of a 
polite and commercial society, in Hazlitt the gesture of the Romantic essayist postulates a 
higher, unattainable unity that transcends the social. By aestheticising (or, borrowing 
Duncan’s terminology, lyricising) the liminal, diplomatic intellect of its eighteenth-century 
precursors, the sublime performance of the Romantic familiar essay acquires significance not 
as a pragmatic regulator of communication, but as the hypostatised other of a lost wholeness 
that surpasses public discourse. By transforming Hume’s ideal of conversable 
intersubjectivity into an incommunicable depth of subjectivity, Hazlitt exchanges an essayism 
of liminality for an essayism of the sublime. 
 
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH 
                                                          
29 Hazlitt, Works, VIII, 6-7. 
